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Abstract 
 
This paper documents the effects of social cohesion and institutions on public policies in the 
MENA region using the three-stage least squares (3SLS) method for panel data to deal with 
the problems of simultaneity and correlation of errors. Our main findings show that the impact 
of social cohesion on public policies is strengthened only at high qualities of institutions. In 
other words, there is a threshold effect of institutions beyond which social cohesion has a 
positive impact on public policies.  
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 1. Introduction 
 
Recent years have seen renewed interest in the concept of social cohesion due especially to 
rising of income inequalities (Bernard, 1999; Stiglitz, 2006; Rajulton, 2007; 2012; Alesina et 
al. 2016) despite the emergence at the global level of a middle class (OCDE, 2012). We are 
thus witnessing an increase in social conflicts and tensions (Wilkinson, 2004; Foa, 2011) 
notably as a consequence of shifting wealth (OCDE, 2012). These phenomena have  greatly 
undermined trust (Putnam et al. 1993; Fukuyama, 1995) especially in the Middle East and 
North Africa (MENA), those countries undergoing major demographic, social and cultural 
changes (Courbage and Todd, 2007), but also serious disturbances (World Bank, 2015) and 
deterioration  of their welfare (Dang and Ianchovichina, 2016). Whether or not they are oil 
producers, these countries do indeed experience higher levels of corruption (in some cases 
reaching state capture) and suffer from weak skills of public sector officials and insufficiently 
democratic and participatory ways of governance (Manning, 2001; Amar and Berthier, 2007; 
Cameron, 2010, Cammett and Diwan, 2013), This raises the question of the quality of 
institutions and the effectiveness of the public policies pursued. 
We note that there are few written works or studies on the relationship between social 
cohesion, institutions and public policies in the MENA region. For our part, we believe that a 
new focus based on neo-institutional theory (Williamson, 1996) is required, highlighting the 
role of social cohesion in the dynamics of institutional strengthening and the effectiveness of 
public policies. 
The paper proceeds as follows: Section 1 provides a brief review of previous research on 
trust, institutions and public policies. Section 2 discusses the model, data source, variables, 
and estimation methods used in our analysis. Section 3 presents and discusses our main results 
on the relationship between trust, institutions and public policies in the MENA region and 
Section 4 concludes the paper. 
 
 
 
 
 
2.1 Trust and institutions 
 
Of the many definitions of social cohesion, we refer to the one given by Chan et al. (2006) 
according to which: “Social cohesion is a state of affairs concerning both the vertical and the 
horizontal interactions among members of society as characterized by a set of attitudes and 
norms that includes trust, a sense of belonging and the willingness to participate and help, as 
well as their behavioural manifestations” (Chan et al, 2006, p18). Coleman (1988), Putnam et 
al. (1993) and Fukuyama (1995) attribute a key role to social capital and trust in strengthen 
economic efficiency.  According to these authors, trust and social capital determine the 
performance of institutions of society. Beugelsdjik (2006) argues that the macro measure of 
trust and the existing measures of institutions represent elements of the same dimension. 
Together they measure the performance of institutions. Thus, according to Mangematin 
(1998), institutional trust building can be likened to subscribing to the social contract 
[Rousseau], a high level of trust between citizens affecting positively the performance of all 
institutions of society including companies (Fukuyama, 1995). 
2.2 Trust and public policies 
 
According to Easterly et al. (2006), social cohesion determines the quality of institutions, 
which in turn have an effect on the conception and implementation of pro-growth policy. In 
the same way, La porta et al. (1997) explain that general trust results in better government 
performance. Indeed, according to Humphrey and Schmitz (1998) trust produces cooperation, 
which in turn reduces transaction costs by facilitating coordination. It thus appears that 
cohesive societies are those having the best quality of institutions. In these societies, people 
are unlikely to be able so easily to take advantage of the public infrastructure (Roth, 2009) 
because it would be easier to cope with the free rider problem (Humphrey and Schmitz, 
1998). 
 
3. Methodology and Data 
3.1 Empirical model 
 
In order to investigate the relationship between social cohesion, institutions and public 
policies in the MENA region, following Easterly et al. (2006), our parsimonious model may 
be written as: 
In the first step, social cohesion and education such as Alesina and Perotti (1996) will be 
determining factors of institutions (equation 1): 
 𝐼𝑁𝑆𝑇𝑖𝑡  =  𝛼𝑖 +  𝛽1𝑇𝑅𝑈𝑆𝑇𝑖𝑡  + 𝛽2  𝐸𝐷𝑈𝐶𝑖𝑡 +  𝜀𝑖𝑡                    (1) 
 
Where INSTit represents institutions, TRUSTit is the indicator of social cohesion, EDUCit is the 
proxy of human capital, and εit is the error term.  
In the second stage, institutions and social cohesion will be introduced into the public policies 
function (equation 2): 
𝑃𝑈𝐵𝑃𝑂𝐿𝑖𝑡  =  𝜁𝑖 +  𝛾1𝐼𝑁𝑆𝑇𝑖𝑡  + 𝛾2  𝐶𝑂𝑁𝐹𝑖𝑡 +  µ𝑖𝑡                               (2) 
 
Where public policies PUBPOLit will be determined based on institutions INSTit, social 
cohesion TRUSTit and µ𝑖𝑡is the error term. 
We applied the three-stage least squares 3SLS method (Zellner and Theil, 1962 ; Cameron et 
Trivedi, 2005) to estimate our simultaneous equations model. This choice is justified by the 
fact that 3SLS allows us to correct both the correlation between the errors as well as the 
possible simultaneity problem between the dependent variable and some explanatory 
variables. To use this method in the light of panel data Cornwell et al. (1992) explain that, in 
order to have efficient estimators, the three-stage least squares method can be applied to data 
that have undergone a "within" transformation.  
 3.2 Description and sources of the data  
 Social cohesion  
Unlike social capital that is defined as a variable at the micro level, our study focuses on the 
characteristics of the whole society where the concept of social cohesion will be more 
appropriate. In the literature we find several indicators to measure social cohesion at the 
societal level; among these measures we shall use trust as a proxy for social cohesion in a 
country. 
 Measuring trust 
The question used to assess the level of trust in a society is: "Generally speaking, would you 
say that most people can be trusted, or that you can't be too careful in dealing with people?"  
As is the case of Knack and Keefer (1997) our trust indicator is the percentage of respondents 
in each nation replying "most people can be trusted" (after deleting the "don't know" 
responses). The question is from the World Value Survey that provides a longitudinal, 
international database of norms, attitudes and values. 
Because of the problem of missing data on trust, we rely on the dataset developed by 
Castellacci and Natera (2011) who used a method of multiple imputations in order to 
construct a large dataset containing a great number of indicators including trust over the 
period 1980-2008. This dataset provide data on six countries in the MENA region that will the 
subject of our analysis which are: Algeria, Iran, Jordan, Morocco, Saudi Arabia and Turkey. 
 
Table 1 shows the description and definition of all variables used in our analysis (see 
Appendix). 
Table 2 shows the descriptive statistics 
Through this work, we shall examine empirically the link between social cohesion, 
institutions and public policies from a panel of six MENA countries with time intervals 
between 1980 and 2008. On the basis of the framework presented above and following 
Easterly et al. (2006), the underlying assumption is formulated as follows: 
Hypothesis:  Public policies are more effective in a high quality institutional environment and 
such institutions in turn are more likely to be found in cohesive societies. 
The aim of our work is to verify, on the one hand, if cohesion is a key determinant of 
institutions, and on the other hand, whether the effect of social cohesion on public policies is 
conditional on the existence of good institutions. We therefore seek to check if there is a 
threshold beyond which the effect of social cohesion on public policies becomes significantly 
positive. To this end, we include into our model two interaction terms, namely: 
The interplay is analysed between social cohesion and institutions (CS * INST) and the 
interplay between social cohesion and the institutions squared (CS * INST2). 
4. Results and Discussion 
The main purpose of this paper is to examine the relationship between social cohesion, 
institutions and public policies through a Panel analysis. The findings are presented in Tables 
3, 4, 5 and 6 (see Appendix). In the first step estimations (Table 3) we introduced the number 
of hospital beds as a proxy for public policy expenditure and the rule of law as an indicator of 
institutions.  Results (equations 1 and 2) show a significant negative effect of trust on public 
policies and a significant positive effect on institutions, whereas institutions exhibit no 
significant effect on public policies. These results disprove partially our predictions. 
Equations 3 and 4 (Table 3) introduce an interaction term between trust and institutions 
(Trust*Inst), presenting a negative coefficient indicating that even improving the quality of 
institutions, the relationship between trust and public policies remains negative. For further 
insight into these findings, we test the presence of nonlinearity like Baliamoune-Lutz and 
Mavrotas (2009) and Baliamoune-Lutz (2012).  In equations 5 and 6 we also include the 
interaction between trust and institutions (using the square of institutions). We find that the 
interaction term (Trust*Inst
2
) has a positive and statistically significant impact suggesting that 
the effect of trust on public 
policies is strengthened solely in high quality institutions. Otherwise, there is a threshold 
effect of institutions beyond which trust has a positive impact on public policies. 
Similar results are obtained in Tables 4, 5 and 6 when we used other indicators of both 
institutions and public policies. It should be noted that that we have tested other indicators, 
but we present only those that yield significant results. 
The effect of education on institutions is statistically significant and presents mitigated results. 
Indeed, education has a positive effect on the rule of law and civil liberties, whereas, this 
effect is negative when it comes to voice and accountability and political rights. 
5. Conclusion 
In this paper, we have examined the relationship between social cohesion, institutions and 
public policies in the MENA region over the period 1980-2008 using the three-stage least 
squares (3SLS) estimation. The underlying purpose of this study is to explore if social 
cohesion enhances institutions, and if those institutions constitute the channel through which 
social cohesion affects public policies. Our main findings show that good institutions are 
more likely to be found in cohesive societies, and that more effective public policies require 
an environment of good institutions and social cohesion. They also show the existence of a 
threshold effect of institutions beyond which social cohesion has a positive impact on public 
policies. We contend that the neo-institutional hypothesis according to which institutions and 
structures of government are inter-independent (Williamson, 1996) is based on the notion that 
it is necessary to implement social policy in conjunction with strengthening institutional 
structures (Errami and Cargneoll-Charles, 2016). This interdependence in MENA countries 
between regime changes and reforms in public policy reforms constitutes the principal 
concern in the phases of ‘transition’ and democratic ‘consolidation’ (Bezes, 2007) associated 
with democratic rules and the operational characteristics of authoritarian regimes (Diamond, 
2002). These results emphasise the absence of consideration of the social role of institutions 
and founders of public services in emerging economies (Errami and Cargnello-Charles, 2016).   
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Appendix 
Table (1): Description and definition of variables 
Variable Description Source 
Trust Most people can be trusted. Percentage of respondents who "agree" with this statement. Castellacci, F and J. M.Natera (2011) 
      
Education The average years of total schooling completed in population over 15. Barro and Lee (2001) 
      
Fixed telephone 
subscriptions  
Fixed telephone subscriptions (per 100 people). World Bank 
      
Voice and Accountability Captures perceptions of the extent to which a country's citizens are able to participate in selecting their government, as well as freedom WGI 
  of expression, freedom of association, and a free media  (-2,5 ; 2,5).   
      
Rule of Law Captures perceptions of the extent to which agents have confidence in and abide by the rules of society, and in particular the quality of contract WGI 
  enforcement, property rights, the police, and the courts, as well as the likelihood of crime and violence  (-2,5 ; 2,5).   
      
Political rights Measures the free popular participation in the political process (-7, -1). Freedom House 
      
Civil liberties Measures the basic freedoms of citizens without interference from the State (-7, -1). Freedom House 
      
Internet Internet users (per 100 people) World Bank 
      
Paved roads 
Paved roads, surfaced with crushed stone, hydrocarbon binder, bituminized agents as a percentage of the total of the entire road network length 
of the country. 
Banque mondiale 
      
Hospital beds Per 1000 people Hospital beds include inpatient beds available in public, private, general, and specialized hospitals and rehabilitation centers. World Bank 
 
 
Table (2): Descriptive statistics 
 
 
Table (3): Social cohesion, institutions and public policies 
  3SLS 
  Hospital beds Rule of law Hospital beds Rule of law Hospital beds Rule of law 
VARIABLES (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
              
Trust -1.731* 2.212*** -3.673** 2.213*** -3.113* 2.213*** 
  (1.008) (0.785) (1.800) (0.785) (1.861) (0.785) 
Institution -0.303   2.336**   2.244**   
  (0.348)   (0.922)   (0.903)   
Trust*Inst     -1.107**   -1.310***   
      (0.454)   (0.413)   
Trust*Inst2         2.465*   
          (1.471)   
Education   0.00916***   0.00929***   0.00929*** 
    (0.00287)   (0.00287)   (0.00287) 
Constant 2.561*** -2.030*** 5.054*** -2.034*** 4.971*** -2.034*** 
  (0.492) (0.256) (0.554) (0.256) (0.552) (0.256) 
              
Observations 174 174 174 174 174 174 
R-squared 0.933 0.962 0.979 0.962 0.981 0.962 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0. 
Hospital beds : proxy of public policies 
Rule of law : proxy of institutions 
 
      
      
 
 
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
            
Trust 174 26.10  13.33  4.9 65.3 
Education 174 6.53  1.39  3.49  9.13  
Democracy 174  -2.24    5.68  -10 8 
Political rights  174 -5.35  1.18  -7 -3 
Civil liberties 174 -5.14  1.12  -7 -3 
Voice and accountability 174 -0.86  0.50  -1.7 -0.03 
Rule of law 174 -0.17  0.46  -1.192538 0.45  
Fixed telephone subscriptions 174 430.04  360.36  44.84866 1627.06 
Paved road 174 57.94  25.08  21.47 100 
Hospital beds 174 2.17  0.76  0.8 4.1 
Table (4): Social cohesion, institutions and public policies 
  3SLS 
VARIABLES paved raod voiceaccnt paved raod voiceaccnt paved raod voiceaccnt 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Trust -1.75* 0.609 -3.687*** 1.039** -3.993*** 1.039** 
  (1.06) (0.493) (1.240) (0.461) (1.309) (0.461) 
Institution -0.0469   1.019***   0.862***   
  (0.0605)   (0.340)   (0.283)   
Trust*Inst     -3.113***   -4.281***   
      (1.146)   (1.525)   
Trust*Inst2         0.807**   
          (0.324)   
Education   -0.0156***   -0.0951*   -0.0951* 
    (0.00537)   (0.0494)   (0.0494) 
Constant 0.643*** 0.596 1.841*** -0.566 1.675*** -0.566 
  (0.0674) (0.585) (0.366) (0.362) (0.308) (0.362) 
              
Observations 174 174 174 174 174 174 
R-squared 0.987 0.889 0.801 0.855 0.879 0.855 
 
            
Standard errors in parentheses 
     *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Paved road: proxy of public policies 
Voice and accountability: proxy of institutions 
 
Table (5): Social cohesion, institutions and public policies 
  3SLS 
VARIABLES internet civlib internet civlib internet civlib 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Trust -0.385* 1.33 -0.981* 0.219 -0.675*** 0.866 
  (0.200) (0.984) (0.565) (1.09) (0.172) (1.09) 
Institution 0.178*** 
 
0.114***   0.902***   
  (0.0257) 
 
(0.0325)   (0.254)   
Trust*Inst 
  
-0.225**   -2.773***   
  
  
(0.101)   (0.700)   
Trust*Inst2 
   
  0.268***   
  
   
  (0.0717)   
Education 
 
0.490** 
 
0.659***   0.685*** 
  
 
(0.238) 
 
(0.107)   (0.106) 
Constant 1.011*** -2.919** 0.602*** -9.591*** 2.300*** -9.769*** 
  (0.137) (1.430) (0.161) (0.774) (0.549) (0.770) 
  
   
      
Observations 174 174 174 174 174 174 
R-squared 0.810 0.850 0.854 0.818 0.871 0.817 
Standard errors in parentheses 
     *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Internet: proxy of public policies 
Civil liberties: proxy of institutions 
  
Table (6): Social cohesion, institutions and public policies 
  3SLS 
VARIABLES internet polrights internet polrights internet polrights 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Trust -0.412* -0.274 -1.503*** -0.592 -3.540*** -0.560 
  (0.211) (0.809) (0.402) (0.805) (0.898) (0.814) 
Institution 0.106   0.829***   3.556***   
  (0.0811)   (0.190)   (0.849)   
Trust*Inst     -2.504***   -1.567***   
      (0.687)   (0.408)   
Trust*Inst2         1.641***   
          (0.438)   
Education   -0.570**   -0.504**   -0.556** 
    (0.255)   (0.238)   (0.259) 
Constant 0.736 -2.602* 5.007*** -2.971** 7.481*** -2.578 
  (0.484) (1.543) (1.125) (1.445) (1.635) (1.568) 
              
Observations 174 174 174 174 174 174 
R-squared 0.896 0.930 0.901 0.930 0.987 0.933 
Standard errors in parentheses 
     *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Internet: Internet : proxy of public policies 
 Political rights : proxy of institutions 
      
 
 
